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On the Lack of Participating Policy Usage  
by Stock Insurance Companies 
Geoffrey Friesen
University of Nebraska–Lincoln
Abstract
Stock insurers can reduce or eliminate agency conflicts between policyholders 
and stockholders by issuing participating insurance. Despite this benefit, most 
stock companies don’t offer participating contracts. This study explains why. 
We study an equilibrium with both stock and mutual insurers in which stock-
holders set premiums to provide a fair expected return on their investment, 
and with a policyholder who chooses the insurance contract that maximizes 
her expected utility. We demonstrate that stockholders cannot profitably of-
fer fully participating contracts, but can profitably offer partially participating 
insurance. However, when the policyholder participation fraction is high, the 
fair-return premium is so large that the policyholder always prefers fully par-
ticipating insurance from the mutual company. Policies with lower levels of 
policyholder participation are optimal for policyholders with relatively high 
risk aversion, though such policies are usually prohibited by insurance legis-
lation. Thus, the reason stock insurers rarely issue participating contracts isn’t 
because the potential benefits are small or unimportant. Rather, profitability 
or regulatory constraints simply prevent stock insurers from exercising those 
benefits in equilibrium.
  
 
Introduction 
The roles of owner and customer are distinctly separate in stock insurance com-
panies, and this separation creates incentive conflicts not present in mutual com-
panies.1 For example, stockholders have an incentive to expropriate policyholder 
wealth by increasing the volatility of the firm’s assets, creating a conflict similar 
to Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) stockholder–bondholder conflict. Also, managers 
1 Ownership rights in a mutual company include membership rights and insurance policy 
rights. Disagreement over the exact meaning of membership rights has led to a great deal of 
recent controversy (for example, see Belth (1997) and Adkins (1997)). For the purposes of this 
paper, the controversy is incidental, since the key feature is the presence (or absence) of the 
stockholder-policyholder incentive conflict. This conflict is present in all stock companies, and 
absent in all mutual companies, regardless of the exact definition of membership rights.
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of a stock insurer may rationally forego certain positive net present value proj-
ects, and this underinvestment problem can be particularly severe among insur-
ers with high leverage.
Stock insurers can reduce or eliminate these incentive conflicts by issuing par-
ticipating insurance policies. Participating policies pay dividends based on devi-
ations of actual claims, interest, and expenses from the assumptions built into the 
premium, thus allowing policyholders to share in the insurer’s aggregate profits 
(Black and Skipper, 2000). Garven and Pottier (1995) develop a formal model of 
participating insurance and demonstrate that participating policies can eliminate 
the risk-shifting conflict between a stock company’s policyholders and stockhold-
ers. Krishnaswami and Pottier (2001) show that although participating business 
can lead to problems of reduced managerial effort, it effectively eliminates both 
the underinvestment and risk-shifting conflicts.
And yet, it is an empirical fact that stock insurance companies rarely issue par-
ticipating business.2 In light of the potential benefits, the general absence of par-
ticipating policies among stock insurers is not well understood. The primary ob-
jective of the current study is to develop a formal model that helps explain the 
strong positive association between participating contracts and the mutual 
organization.3
It should be noted that the general absence of participating contracts among 
stock insurers is not necessarily evidence against the models of Garven and Pottier 
(1995) and Krishnaswami and Pottier (2001). Indeed, we would argue that those 
models are not only valid, but offer important insights into the benefits of partic-
ipating business for stock insurers. In fact, Krishnaswami and Pottier (2001) offer 
one potential explanation for stock insurers’ use of participating policies. Specif-
ically, their model suggests that participating policy usage is dictated by a trade-
off between the benefits of reducing the risk-shifting and underinvestment con-
flicts and the costs of exacerbating the manager-stockholder conflict. Their model 
does a good job explaining cross-sectional variation among the subset of stock in-
surers that issue participating contracts. At the margin, the cost-benefit argument 
seems plausible.
However, explaining the complete absence of participating contracts among 
the majority of stock insurers requires that the benefits of such contracts are usu-
ally too small to matter. We offer an alternative explanation, one that is fully con-
sistent with participating contract benefits of first-order importance as described 
in Garven and Pottier (1995) and Krishnaswami and Pottier (2001). Specifically, 
2 For example, Krishnaswami and Pottier (2001) find that 83 percent of stock insurers in their 
sample had no participating business at all. Among the 17 percent of stock insurers issuing 
participating insurance, only 7.1 percent of their in-force business was classified as participat-
ing. In contrast, Garven and Pottier (1995) find that among a sample of mutual companies, all 
had some participating business, with an average of 94.2 percent of in-force business classified 
as participating.
3 The strong association between mutual companies and participating insurance has resulted 
in some confusion in the literature, with a number of papers using the terms “mutuality” 
and “participating insurance” interchangeably. Smith and Stutzer (1995) examine the histor-
ical evolution of participating insurance, and note that neither their paper nor any other has 
formally addressed why the use of participating insurance contracts is so strongly associated 
with the mutual organization.
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we develop a general equilibrium model of participating insurance contracts uti-
lizing the contingent claims framework of Doherty and Garven (1986). In our 
model, it’s not that the benefits of issuing participating contracts are small or un-
important. Rather, profitability or regulatory constraints simply prevent stock in-
surers from exercising those benefits in equilibrium.
To preview, our model includes both stock and mutual insurance companies, 
as well as a policyholder who chooses the insurance contract which maximizes 
her expected utility. In the model, the mutual company issues only fully partic-
ipating insurance. The stock company, on the other hand, can issue both partici-
pating and nonparticipating insurance contracts, and sets premiums on all poli-
cies to provide stockholders with a fair expected return.4 For the stock insurer, we 
consider both fully and partially participating contracts, the latter of which enti-
tles both stockholders and policyholders to predetermined fractions of aggregate 
insurer profits.5
A key feature of our model is that we simultaneously consider the stock insur-
er’s decision to sell insurance (the fair-return problem) and the policyholder’s op-
timal purchase decision (the policyholder choice problem). This turns out to be 
critical because, as we show, the stockholders’ fair-return premium frequently ex-
ceeds the price policyholders are willing to pay. In particular, when the policy-
holder participation fraction is high, the stockholders’ fair-return premium is so 
large that the utility-maximizing policyholder always prefers fully participating 
insurance issued by the mutual company. In these instances, stockholders could 
reduce their various agency conflicts by issuing participating contracts if they 
could find policyholders willing to purchase them. However, these contracts are 
not optimal for any policyholder, and thus are never observed in equilibrium.
At lower levels of policyholder participation, a different story emerges. Again, 
stockholders willingly offer partially participating insurance contracts, but now 
such contracts are also optimal for policyholders with relatively high levels of risk-
aversion.6 Given their feasibility, it would seem that such partially participating 
contracts would be desirable from the perspective of the stock insurer, since they of-
fer both profitability and a reduction in stockholder-policyholder agency conflicts. 
In light of this, it is puzzling that such contracts are so rarely observed. We suggest 
that the absence can be traced directly to specific insurance legislation which pro-
4 While this framework allows insurers to “set” the premium, the equilibrium premium is de-
fined as the premium at which the market value of the stockholders’ claim equals the stock-
holders’ paid-in equity. This equilibrium premium is constrained to be no greater than the 
premium which provides a fair expected return. For a given set of investment and underwrit-
ing risks, all insurers will charge the same fair-return premium. In this sense, insurance com-
panies are price takers, where the price includes a normal profit (equal to the market-based 
fair expected return), but zero economic profit.
5 As we demonstrate below, the extreme case of fully participating insurance never obtains with 
a stock insurer. That is, when a stock company sets premiums to provide a fair expected return 
on stockholders investment, stockholders will never find it optimal to offer fully participating 
insurance. The obvious reason is that fully participating contracts require the stockholders to 
bear a certain amount of downside risk (related to unexpected claims or unfavorable invest-
ment returns), yet exclude the stockholders from potential profits.
6 A limiting case of our model demonstrates that the most risk-averse policyholders optimally 
purchase nonparticipating insurance issued by the stock company.
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hibits partially participating contracts with low levels of policyholder participation. 
To summarize our results, the partially participating contracts allowed by law are 
undesirable to policyholders, while the partially participating contracts desired by 
certain policyholders aren’t allowed by law. As a practical matter then, stock insur-
ance companies and participating policies are often incompatible.
Contingent claims models similar to ours have been applied to both prop-
erty-liability insurance (Doherty and Garven, 1986) and life insurance (Garven 
and Pottier, 1995 and Krishnaswami and Pottier, 2001). While we feel our two-pe-
riod model most literally resembles a property-liability contract, Garven and Pot-
tier (1995) note that participating payoff features like ours depend both on claims 
and interest, and thus also resemble the payoff structure of cash-value universal 
life insurance.7 In addition, policyholder risk aversion plays an important role in 
our model. We find it more sensible to talk about the risk aversion of individu-
als rather than corporations, which suggests that our model is most applicable to 
personal, as opposed to commercial, insurance lines.
This study also contributes to our understanding of the relationship between 
preferences and participation in aggregate losses. More specifically, we demon-
strate that for individuals with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility, 
the desire to purchase participating insurance is decreasing in risk aversion. In 
other words, policyholders with low levels of risk aversion will tend to associate 
with participating mutual contracts, while those with high levels of risk aversion 
will desire partially or nonparticipating insurance. The intuitive reason for this is 
straightforward: participating in aggregate (risky) profits exposes an insured to 
additional risk, and will be chosen only by those most willing to bear such risk. 
This result is consistent with the results of Borch (1968), but contrasts with the as-
sumptions in more recent work on organizational form (see e.g., Remmers, 2003).
The rest of the article is structured as follows: Section 1 reviews the related 
literature. Section 2 develops a basic model of nonparticipating insurance where 
stockholders use a multivariate contingent claims framework to set premiums 
that produce a fair expected return. We then extend the basic model to allow pol-
icyholder participation in aggregate profits. Section 3 examines the policyholder 
choice problem and describes an equilibrium in which policyholders choose the 
optimal insurance contract when stockholders set premiums to provide a fair ex-
pected return. Section 4 concludes.
 
Insurance Contract Equilibrium 
A general equilibrium analysis of insurance contracts involves an examination 
of both the policyholder’s decision to purchase insurance and the insurance com-
pany’s decision to sell. The “policyholder-choice problem” of choosing the opti-
mal level of nonparticipating insurance coverage is well understood in the con-
text of both nonparticipating (Borch, 1968 and Arrow, 1974) and participating 
contracts (Doherty, 1991; Doherty and Dionne, 1993; Smith and Stutzer, 1995). All 
7 That said, permanent life insurance policies, such as whole life or universal life, have a num-
ber of features not captured by our model. For example, expected claims, cash values, surren-
der values, and dividends vary period-to-period. This variation not only makes it difficult for 
buyers to know the price they are paying for coverage, but also cannot be adequately modeled 
in this (or any other) two-period model.
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of these studies either assume insurers are risk-neutral or impose a zero-profit 
condition when setting premiums. That is, none of these studies explicitly incor-
porate the stockholder problem of determining the risk-based premium necessary 
to generate an acceptable expected return. Such assumptions simplify the analy-
sis, and are justified when developing models to understand the basic properties 
of policyholder choice.
Nevertheless, the assumptions of risk-neutrality and zero-profit are unrealistic 
because they ignore the premium an insurer demands for bearing risk. Stockhold-
ers supply capital to a stock insurer only when they expect to earn a fair return on 
their investment. The problem of setting premiums that generate fair expected re-
turns is often referred to as the “fair return problem,” and a second strand of lit-
erature has examined this problem. For instance, the problem of setting fair pre-
miums has been analyzed in a Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) context by 
Hill (1979) and Fairley (1979), and in an option pricing framework that accounts 
for the risk of default and the value of tax liabilities (Doherty and Garven, 1986). 
These articles acknowledge the stockholders’ need to earn a fair return, but they 
do not explicitly incorporate the policyholder choice aspect of the problem. That 
is, although they calculate the premiums stockholders must charge to earn an ac-
ceptable return, they do not ask how much (if any) insurance risk-averse policy-
holders will optimally purchase at the fair-return price.
The next section develops an equilibrium model of participating insurance 
contracts that combines the policyholder choice and stockholder return problems. 
We are unaware of any articles that combine the policyholder choice problem and 
stockholder return problem in this way. As such, this aspect of our model repre-
sents an additional contribution of the current study.
 
A Model of Nonparticpating Insurance Policies 
This section utilizes the option pricing framework developed in Doherty and 
Garven (1986) to calculate the premium stockholders must charge to provide a 
fair expected return on both nonparticipating and participating contracts. Later 
in Section 3, we will build upon this model to analyze the optimal purchase de-
cisions by policyholders, recognizing that an equilibrium can exist only when 
stockholders set a fair-return premium and when policyholders find it desirable 
to purchase insurance at that price.
  
A Basic Model of Nonparticipating Insurance
We present a one-period model of the insurance firm that is a special case of 
the model in Doherty and Garven (1986). While acknowledging that in practice, 
mutual insurers issue some nonparticipating business, we examine the nonpar-
ticipating policy in the context of a stock-insurance company, where such policies 
are most common.
In period zero, residual claimholders contribute equity of S0, and the policy-
holder pays a premium of P0, producing a total time zero cash flow of 
Y0 = (S0 + P0)                                                            (1)
At the end of the period, claims to the policyholder are discharged and tax liabil-
ities paid, with any excess assets reverting to the residual claimholders. The total 
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terminal cash flow (before payment of claims) is 
Y˜1 = (S0 + P0) (1 + r˜ i)                                                       (2)
where  r˜ i  is the stochastic investment income earned during the period.8 Define 
L˜1 to be the insured’s end-of-period claim cost and τ the corporate tax rate. The 
terminal cash flow,  Y˜1, is divided among the various claimholders, with the poli-
cyholder receiving H˜ 1, the government receiving  T˜1, and the residual claimhold-
ers receiving the excess (if any)  E˜1 .9 Then,
(3)
(4)
 (5)
Each of these claims can be expressed as options, and can thus be valued using 
the appropriate option-pricing methodology. The value of the claims at time zero 
will be given by: 
(6)
 (7)
 (8)
where  V(·)  is the valuation operator and  C(A; B)  represents the current mar-
ket value of a European call option written on an asset with terminal price A and 
strike price B. H0 represents the value of the policyholder’s claim at time zero, T0 
represents the value of the government’s claim, and Ve is the time zero value of 
the stockholders’ claim. The term C1 represents the stockholders’ call option on 
the firm’s assets. If the pretax value of equity is positive, the stockholders have a 
valuable claim. When the cash flow to equity is negative (i.e. aggregate claims ex-
ceed the value of the firm’s assets), stockholders have the ability to (at least par-
tially) default on their obligation to the policyholder.10 The value of the stockhold-
8 Doherty and Garven include a funds-generating coefficient in their model of investment re-
turns, representing an adjustment to compensate for the difference between the period in 
the model and the average delay between receipt of premiums and payment of policyholder 
claims. For simplicity, we assume k =1, although the results are qualitatively identical for the 
more general case.
9 Doherty and Garven include a parameter θ to reflect the tax-exempt securities that corpora-
tions may hold. Without loss of generality, we set θ= 1.
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ers’ claim is reduced by government’s call option on a fraction of taxable income, 
given by  τC2 .
Stockholders charge a premium, P0, which provides them a fair expected re-
turn. The value of the stockholders’ equity claim, given in Equation (8), is in-
creasing in the premium P0. Stockholders calculate P0 so that the value of their 
equity claim, Ve , is equal to the initial equity investment S0, which is deter-
mined exogenously. Since Y˜1  and Y0 are functions of S0 and P0, we can rewrite 
Equation (8) to characterize the premium, P*0, that will produce the fair return 
to stockholders: 
(9)
Equation (9) can be interpreted as follows: Given the distribution of investment 
returns (r˜ i) and claims (L˜), and an exogenously determined equity investment, S0, 
there exists a unique premium, P*0, such that the value of the stockholders’ equity 
claim equals the initial investment, S0.11,12
 
Properties of Nonparticipating Insurance under Normality Assumption
Assuming aggregation conditions hold (Rubinstein, 1974) Equation (9) can be 
priced claims using a discrete-time, risk-neutral-valuation approach. Using this 
methodology requires one to make certain assumptions about the joint distribu-
tion of the underlying stochastic variables r˜ i and L˜, as well as the shape of the 
representative investor’s utility function. Brennan (1979) demonstrates that the 
risk-neutral valuation approach holds under the assumptions that: (1) returns 
and claims are jointly normally distributed and the representative investor exhib-
its CARA; or (2) returns and claims are jointly lognormally distributed and the 
representative investor exhibits constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). Stapleton 
and Subrahmanyam (1984) extend Brennan’s results to price multivariate contin-
gent claims, such as the call option with a stochastic exercise price considered 
here. The remainder of the article uses the option pricing framework from Staple-
10 Note that this analysis ignores the impact of insurance guaranty funds from the policyholder’s 
perspective. However, the presence of guaranty funds does not change the premiums stock-
holders must charge to provide themselves a fair expected return, and as such does not im-
pact this part of the analysis.
11 While  r˜i does not appear in the expression for Equation (9), it does affect the value of stock-
holder equity through Y˜1  (see definition in Equation 2).
12 The premium is constrained to be no greater than the premium which provides a fair expected 
return, and for a given set of investment and underwriting risks, all insurers will charge the 
same fair-return premium. A sufficient condition for this is that the cost of capital across insur-
ers is equal to the equilibrium expected return. If an insurer’s cost of capital is lower than the 
equilibrium expected return, it would be possible for an insurer to profitably offer a contract 
at a lower premium. In addition, insurance rate regulation might prevent the insurer from 
charging the fair-return premium. In the latter case, the insurer might find it optimal to offer 
a contract at the lower, regulated premium, so long as the resulting expected return exceeded 
the insurer’s hurdle rate.
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ton and Subrahmanyam (1984), along with the assumption of CARA and joint-
normality to evaluate the expression in Equation (9).13
The value of the first call option, C1, can be written as 
(10)
where f˜(Y˜1 , L˜ ) is the bivariate risk-neutral probability density function of Y˜1 and 
L˜ . The relevant risk-neutral expectations are:
[equations]
Equation (12) can be rewritten by defining X˜ ≡ Y˜1 – L˜ , which is the excess of as-
sets over claims. The risk-neutral expectation of  X˜ is given by Ê(X˜) = Ê(Y˜1)  –  Ê(L˜) 
= (S0 + P0)(1 + rf) – Ê(L˜), and the variance of  X˜ is  σ
2
x = (S0 + P0)2σ
2
i + σ
2
L – 2(S0 + P0) 
cov(L˜ , r˜ i). Doherty and Garven (1986) show that the value of the stockholders’ call 
option, C1, is given by
(11)
where  N[·]  is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, and  n[·]  is 
the standard normal density function.
The value of the government’s call option on taxable income is  τC2, and C2 can 
be written as 
(12)
Define the normal variable W ≡ Y˜1 – Y0 + P0 – L˜. The risk-neutral expectation of W˜ 
is given by  Ê(W˜ ) = Ê(Y˜1) – Y0 + P0 – E(L˜ )  = (S0 + P0) · rf + P0 – E(L˜ ),   and the variance 
13 Both claims and investment return processes can also be approximated by a lognormal distri-
bution. However, we use the normal distribution assumption for expositional clarity. Similar 
results under the lognormality framework are available from the author upon request.
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of  W˜ is  σ2W = (S0 + P0)
2σ2i + σ
2
L – 2(S0 + P0) cov(L˜ , r˜ i). Doherty and Garven show 
that (12) can be expressed as
(13)
Using (11) and (13) allows us to write the market value of equity as: 
(14)
Given exogenously specified parameter values for the required equity  (S0), the 
insured loss (E(L˜), σL), the invested assets  (σi, ρiL, βi), the tax rate (τ), and capi-
tal markets parameters (rf, E(r˜m), σm), stockholders solve Equation (12) for the pre-
mium, P*0, that equates Ve with the S0. Stockholders are willing to insure the loss  L˜ 
at this price, since the premium is calculated to provide stockholders with a “fair” 
expected rate of return. In this context, “fair” means that in return for the initial 
investment of S0, the stockholders receive a claim with a capital market value also 
equal to S0. Of course, the stockholders’ expected payoff is actually greater than 
S0, but the riskiness of the claim reduces the claim’s value from the expected pay-
off to S0. Figure 1 displays the payoffs to various claimants under nonparticipat-
ing insurance.
Figure 1. Payoffs Associated with Nonparticipating Insurance. Illustrates the payoffs 
to policyholders, stockholders, and the government (taxes) associated with a nonpartic-
ipating insurance contract. These payoffs are specified by Equations (3)–(5) in the text, 
respectively.
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 Incorporating a Participation Feature
Participating insurance allows the policyholder to share in some fraction, γ, of the 
aggregate profits (losses) of the insurance company via policy dividends (or as-
sessments).14 The payoffs to the various claimants under participating insurance 
are depicted in Figure 2 (partially participating) and Figure 3 (fully participat-
ing.). Total firm assets, Y1, are displayed on the horizontal axis, while payoffs are 
on the vertical axis.
The nonparticipating payoffs from Section 2B can be modified to reflect the 
participation benefits, with the difference being that the policyholder receives a 
fraction, γ, of after-tax income, leaving only (1 − γ) of the after-tax income for 
stockholders. Thus, the terminal cash flow, Y˜1, is divided among the various 
claimholders, with the participating policyholder receiving H˜ 1
p, the government 
receiving T˜ 1
p, and the stockholders receiving the excess E˜ 1
p. It is assumed that the 
return of stockholder equity does not constitute a taxable distribution to stock-
holders. That is, taxable income is defined to equal end-of-period assets, minus 
claims, minus stockholder equity: 
(15)
14 In our model, assessments occur only when the investment income is below -100 percent, that 
is, when Y˜1 is negative (see Equation (3)). As long as the insurance company invests in finan-
cial assets with limited liability, the theoretically possible assessment will not come to pass.
Figure 2. Payoffs Associated with Partial Participating Insurance (γ < 1). Illustrates the 
payoffs to policyholders, stockholders, and the government (taxes) associated with a non-
participating insurance contract. These payoffs are specified by Equations (15)–(17) in the 
text, respectively.
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 (16)
 (17)
The value of the claims at time zero will be given by: 
(18)
 (19)
 (20)
The value of the call options C1 and C2 are the same under participating insur-
ance as they are under nonparticipating insurance. Once again, given parameter 
values for the variables  S0, σi, E(L˜ ), σL, ρiL, rf, τ, βi, E(r˜m), σm, stockholders solve 
Equation (20) for the premium,  PP*0, that equates  V
P
e  with the assumed value of 
S0. This is the lowest premium stockholders will offer, as it provides stockholders 
with a fair expected rate of return on participating insurance.
From Equation (20) it is clear why fully participating insurance (γ = 1) can-
not be associated with stock companies. Under fully participating insurance, the 
Figure 3. Payoffs Associated with Fully Participating Insurance (γ = 1). Illustrates the 
payoffs to policyholders, stockholders, and the government (taxes) associated with a non-
participating insurance contract. These payoffs are specified by Equations (15)–(17) in the 
text, respectively.
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value of stockholders’ claims is given by  V Pe  = C1 –  C2 = V(max(Y˜1 – L˜ , 0) – 
V(max(Y˜1 – S0 – L˜ , 0)). This payoff structure is shown in Figure 3. The payoff to 
stockholders is zero when Y˜1  < L˜, between zero and S0 when 0 < Y˜1 – L˜ < S0, and 
equal to S0 when S0 < Y˜1 – L˜ . The value of this claim is strictly less than S0 and 
does not depend on the premium P0. Stockholders cannot earn a fair rate of re-
turn no matter how large a premium they charge. This is because stockholders 
continue to bear some of the firm’s downside risk, but enjoy none of the upside 
benefits since all profits accrue to the participating policyholders.15
Thus, stock insurers will never issue fully participating insurance, since such 
contracts cannot be offered on a profitable basis. It is possible for stock insurers 
to profitably issue partially participating insurance (γ < 1), and the next section 
demonstrates that such contracts are optimal for some policyholders.
 
The Policyholder Problem 
Given the fair return premiums charged by the stockholders, the policyhold-
er’s problem is to choose the participation level that maximizes expected utility. 
Recall that the stock insurer offers nonparticipating policies at a price of  P*0  and 
partially participating policies at a price of  PP*0, where prices are calculated us-
ing the framework developed in Section 2. To simplify notation, we generalize 
slightly the interpretation for  PP*0, allowing it to represent the premium stock-
holders charge for any given level of participation. Thus,  PP*0  is a function of γ, 
and different levels of γ will produce different values of  PP*0.
We assume that the mutual company issues only fully participating policies, 
with the premium for a fully participating mutual contract equal to  P*0 + S0. That 
is, the cost of a fully participating mutual insurance contract is equivalent to the 
cost of a nonparticipating stock policy plus the required initial equity investment. 
The mutual customer effectively purchases the stockholders’ position for S0, ob-
taining the rights to after-tax income and bearing the additional downside risk 
that occurs when assets exceed claims, but are less than claims plus initial equity.
The option pricing framework used by stockholders to calculate premiums 
prevents us from obtaining closed-form solutions for the optimal level of policy-
holder participation. For this reason, we utilize a numerical simulation to char-
acterize the optimal degree of participation as a function of policyholder risk 
aversion.
  
Numerical Simulation of Fair-Return Premiums
Using the option pricing framework from Section 2, we solve for the premiums 
stockholders charge for various levels of policyholder participation, as well as the 
fully participating premium charged by the mutual insurer. The parameter values 
utilized in the simulation are reported in Table 1, panel (a). Table 1, panel (b) con-
tains the fair-return premiums for various levels of policyholder participation.
 Under the assumed parameterization with an expected loss of $1,000, the non-
participating premium equals  P*0 = $1,008.11, since at this premium, Ve = S0 = $500. 
15 The limited liability nature of the equity claim limits the downside risk. In this context, the 
downside risk refers to the possibility of losing the initial equity investment, S0.
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The price for fully participating insurance issued through the mutual company 
is equal to  P*0 + S0 = $1,508.11. The premium on fully participating insurance is 
therefore higher than the premium on nonparticipating insurance. This is consis-
tent with the results of Carson and Forster (2000), who find higher prices for par-
ticipating life insurance policies than for universal life insurance policies. Table 1 
also reports the partially participating insurance premiums for intermediate val-
ues of γ.
The premiums in Table 1 are also consistent with the result from Section 2 that 
stockholders cannot profitably offer fully participating insurance. Specifically, for 
fully participating insurance, the maximum value for the stockholder’s equity 
claim,  V Pe, equals $476.19 and occurs when stockholders charge a premium of  
PP*0 = $10,685.64. Even with a premium equal to ten times expected claims, the 
stockholders’ claim is worth less than the initial paid-in equity of S0 = $500. Figure 
4 illustrates graphically the premiums contained in Table 1.
  
Numerical Simulation of Policyholder Choice Problem
The policyholder chooses the level of participation that maximizes expected 
utility of end-of-period wealth, given the premium schedule  PP*0,  0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. That 
is, the policyholders solve: 
Table 1.  Premiums for Various Levels of Policyholder Participation 
Panel (a)
E(L˜) = 1000   βi = 0.50  
σL = 400      E(ri) = 8.5%  
 rf = 5%     σi = 10.0%  
τ = 35%      E(rm) = 12%  
σm = 20.0%     S 0 = 500  
Panel (b)
Participation Level              Stock Company                                Fully Participating Mutual     
(γ)                                           Premium  PP*0                                    Premium  P*0 + S0 
0 1,008.11 n/a
0.1 1,027.92 n/a
0.2 1,050.25 n/a
0.3 1,075.83 n/a
0.4 1,105.75 n/a
0.5 1,141.00 n/a
0.6 1,187.00 n/a
0.7 1,246.84 n/a
0.8 1,336.92 n/a
0.9 1,517.03 n/a
0.99 4,591.58 n/a
1.0 n/a 1,508.11
For various levels of policyholder participation (γ), stockholders calculate a fair-return premium,  PP
*
0, 
using the framework developed in Section 2 of the text. Parameter values are listed in Panel (a). Panel 
(b) contains the premiums associated with various participation levels. The premium for a fully par-
ticipating mutual contract is assumed to equal  P*0+S0,  the nonparticipating fair-return premium plus 
the exogenously specified stockholder equity investment.
198     Geoffrey  Friesen in  Journal of Risk and Insurance  74  (2007)
Ta
bl
e 
2.
  S
im
ul
at
ed
 E
xp
ec
te
d 
U
til
iti
es
 fo
r V
ar
io
us
 L
ev
el
s 
of
 P
ol
ic
yh
ol
de
r P
ar
tic
ip
at
io
n 
Po
lic
yh
ol
de
r
Ri
sk
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
Pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n 
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
s
A
ve
rs
io
n
 
 0
%
 
10
%
 
   
20
%
 
   
   
 3
0%
   
   
   
   
  4
0%
   
   
   
   
   
50
%
   
   
   
   
  6
0%
   
   
   
   
  7
0%
   
   
   
   
  8
0%
   
   
   
   
   
90
%
   
   
   
   
  9
5%
   
   
   
   
 1
00
%
0.
1 
−1
.0
10
4 
−1
.0
10
4 
−1
.0
10
4 
−1
.0
10
4 
−1
.0
10
4 
−1
.0
10
4 
−1
.0
10
5 
−1
.0
10
6 
−1
.0
10
7 
−1
.0
11
1 
−1
.0
21
5 
−1
.0
09
9 
0.
25
 
−1
.0
26
3 
−1
.0
26
3 
−1
.0
26
3 
−1
.0
26
3 
−1
.0
26
3 
−1
.0
26
3 
−1
.0
26
4 
−1
.0
26
6 
−1
.0
27
0 
−1
.0
28
1 
−1
.0
54
7 
−1
.0
25
0 
0.
5 
−1
.0
53
3 
−1
.0
53
3 
−1
.0
53
2 
−1
.0
53
2 
−1
.0
53
3 
−1
.0
53
4 
−1
.0
53
6 
−1
.0
54
0 
−1
.0
54
8 
−1
.0
57
0 
−1
.1
12
8 
−1
.0
50
7 
0.
75
 
−1
.0
81
0 
−1
.0
80
9 
−1
.0
80
9 
−1
.0
80
9 
−1
.0
81
0 
−1
.0
81
1 
−1
.0
81
5 
−1
.0
82
2 
−1
.0
83
5 
−1
.0
86
9 
−1
.1
74
5 
−1
.0
77
2 
1 
−1
.1
09
5 
−1
.1
09
4 
−1
.1
09
3 
−1
.1
09
3 
−1
.1
09
4 
−1
.1
09
6 
−1
.1
10
2 
−1
.1
11
1 
−1
.1
12
9 
−1
.1
17
6 
−1
.2
39
9 
−1
.1
04
5 
2 
−1
.2
31
1 
−1
.2
30
9 
−1
.2
30
8 
−1
.2
30
8 
−1
.2
31
1 
−1
.2
31
7 
−1
.2
33
0 
−1
.2
35
1 
−1
.2
39
4 
−1
.2
50
3 
−1
.5
45
0 
−1
.2
22
0 
3 
−1
.3
66
3 
−1
.3
65
9 
−1
.3
65
7 
−1
.3
65
9 
−1
.3
66
5 
−1
.3
67
5 
−1
.3
69
9 
−1
.3
73
7 
−1
.3
81
1 
−1
.4
00
1 
−1
.9
34
7 
−1
.3
54
6 
4 
−1
.5
16
4 
−1
.5
15
9 
−1
.5
15
8 
−1
.5
16
1 
−1
.5
17
1 
−1
.5
18
8 
−1
.5
22
6 
−1
.5
28
6 
−1
.5
40
2 
−1
.5
69
4 
−2
.4
34
5 
−1
.5
04
3 
5 
−1
.6
83
4 
−1
.6
82
7 
−1
.6
82
5 
 
−1
.6
83
1 
−1
.6
84
7 
−1
.6
87
3 
−1
.6
93
0 
−1
.7
01
8 
−1
.7
18
7 
−1
.7
60
8 
−3
.0
78
6 
−1
.6
83
8
10
 
−2
.8
44
3 
−2
.8
42
5 
 
−2
.8
43
4 
−2
.8
47
5 
−2
.8
56
0 
−2
.8
68
9 
−2
.8
94
2 
−2
.9
32
5 
−3
.0
03
1 
−3
.1
75
2 
−1
0.
70
44
  
−2
.9
40
0
15
 
−4
.8
28
9 
−4
.8
25
9 
 
−4
.8
31
3 
−4
.8
46
8 
−4
.8
75
9 
−4
.9
19
2 
−4
.9
98
0 
−5
.1
16
5 
−5
.3
31
8 
−5
.8
54
5 
−4
1.
90
43
  
−5
.4
41
8
50
 
−2
64
.6
6 
 
−2
66
.9
21
  
−2
71
.7
16
  
−2
79
.5
02
  
−2
91
.2
25
  
−3
07
.8
52
  
−3
34
.7
48
  
−3
77
.1
26
  
−4
59
.5
31
  
−7
10
.0
09
  −
1E
+0
7 
 
−1
77
6.
03
 
Ta
bl
e 
re
p
or
ts
 s
im
u
la
te
d
 e
xp
ec
te
d
 u
ti
li
ti
es
 f
or
 p
ol
ic
yh
ol
d
er
s 
w
it
h
 s
p
ec
ifi
ed
 l
ev
el
 o
f 
ri
sk
 a
ve
rs
io
n
. E
ac
h
 e
xp
ec
te
d
 u
ti
li
ty
 i
s 
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
 u
si
n
g 
1,
00
0 
si
m
u
la
te
d
 d
ra
w
s 
fr
om
 t
h
e 
jo
in
t 
p
ro
ba
bi
li
ty
 d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
on
 o
f 
lo
ss
es
 a
n
d
 e
xp
ec
te
d
 r
et
u
rn
s.
 P
ol
ic
yh
ol
d
er
s 
ar
e 
as
su
m
ed
 t
o 
p
os
se
ss
 C
on
st
an
t A
bs
ol
u
te
 
R
is
k 
A
ve
rs
io
n
. U
si
n
g 
th
e 
fa
ir
-r
et
u
rn
 p
re
m
iu
m
,  
PP
* 0  
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
 b
y 
st
oc
kh
ol
de
rs
, p
ol
ic
yh
ol
de
rs
 ch
oo
se
 th
e 
le
ve
l o
f p
ar
tic
ip
at
io
n 
th
at
 m
ax
im
iz
es
 th
ei
r 
ex
p
ec
te
d
 u
ti
li
ty
. F
or
 e
ac
h
 le
ve
l o
f 
ri
sk
 a
ve
rs
io
n
, t
h
e 
m
ax
im
iz
ed
 e
xp
ec
te
d
 u
ti
li
ty
 is
 r
ep
or
te
d
 in
 b
ol
d
fa
ce
.
On the Lack of Participating Policy Usage by Stock Insurance Companies     199
(23)
Using the premium data from the previous section, we solve for the optimal 
level of policyholder participation as a function of risk aversion. Table 2 reports 
simulated expected utilities for policyholders with various levels of risk aversion. 
Each expected utility is calculated by simulating 1,000 draws from the joint prob-
ability distribution of losses (L˜) and expected returns (r˜ i). For each simulated pair 
(L˜, r˜ i), we calculate the terminal cash flow to the policyholder for various levels 
of policyholder participation. For each level of participation, the terminal cash 
flow calculation uses the fair-return premium,  PP*0, calculated by stockholders 
according to the framework in Section 2. Policyholders choose the level of par-
ticipation that maximizes their expected utility. Policyholders are assumed to 
Figure 4. Premiums for Various Levels of Policyholder Participation. Figure illustrates 
the fair-return premium for various levels of policyholder participation (γ). Stockholders 
calculate a fair-return premium, PP*0, using the framework developed in Section 2 of the 
text. The premium for a fully participating mutual contract is assumed to equal P*0 + S0.
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possess CARA.16 Initial wealth is assumed to equal $10,000. Table 2 reports sim-
ulated values of expected policyholder utility over a large range of risk aver-
sions. The maximized expected utility is reported in boldface for each level of 
risk aversion.
Full participation is optimal for policyholders with the lowest levels of absolute 
risk aversion, which is consistent with the models of Borch (1968) and Doherty 
and Dionne (1993). Policyholders with intermediate levels of risk aversion desire 
participation at relatively low levels (γ = 10 percent or 20 percent), while the most 
risk-averse policyholders prefer no participation at all.
Interestingly, it is never optimal for any policyholders to choose partially par-
ticipating policies with participation rates above 20 percent. The reason for this is 
that under partially participating contracts, stockholders are fully exposed to the 
downside risk that end-of-period assets are less than realized claims, yet share 
in only a fraction, (1 − γ), of the upside gains when end-of-period assets exceed 
claims. In order to earn a fair expected return, stockholders must charge a very 
large premium in order to reduce the likelihood that end-of-period assets are de-
ficient. These premiums are so large that no policyholder finds it optimal to buy 
such contracts.
Nevertheless, our model suggests that partially participating contracts with 
low participation levels (γ = 10 percent or 20 percent) are feasible, and Garven 
and Pottier (1995) and Krishnaswami and Pottier (2001) have shown that con-
tracts are also desirable since they can mitigate agency conflicts. Yet such policies 
are rarely issued by stock insurance companies. For instance, Smith and Stutzer 
(1995) note that in 1850, stock insurer Manhattan Life offered a policy that paid 
a fraction of profits to policyholders and the remainder to stockholders, but also 
note that such instances are quite rare.
We offer a regulatory explanation for the general absence of partially partic-
ipating insurance. A number of states impose regulations on stock companies 
limiting the extent to which the stockholders may benefit from participating 
business (Black and Skipper, 2000). For instance, the state of New York requires 
that stockholder profits on participating contracts be limited to the larger of (1) 
10 percent of gains on such policies or (2) 50 cents per year per $1,000 of partic-
ipating business (§216, New York Insurance Law).17 In the context of our model, 
the first limitation corresponds to a minimum value of γ = 0.9. We have seen 
that at such high levels of policyholder participation, fair return premiums are 
too high to attract business. In other words, the partially participating contracts 
desired by policyholders aren’t allowed by law, and the partially participating 
contracts allowed by law are undesirable to policyholders. This fundamental in-
16 We have also conducted the simulations over other forms of utility, including CRRA, and the 
basic results are unchanged.
17 The state of Iowa also has a 10% limit on stockholder profits (see Iowa Insurance Code §521.
A5). Black and Skipper (2000) note that similar legislation exists in Canada, the United King-
dom, and other countries. While we have not verified that such regulations exist in all states, 
we note that insurers licensed to conduct business in New York are subject to key portions of 
New York laws in all states in which they do business. From a practical perspective, this extra-
territorial aspect of New York law suggests that many stock insurers may face limits on partic-
ipating profits such as the one we describe.
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compatibility is described in the case study of Fletcher (1966, p. 27), who exam-
ines the motivation for one insurance company that chose to convert from stock 
to mutual form:
“If any one incident could be pinpointed as the one which led to the mutualiza-
tion of this company, that event would be the decision to offer participating life 
insurance policies in addition to the company’s nonparticipating line…When 
the first participating contracts were issued, the company’s management took 
the position that all earnings on that business should be returned to the partic-
ipating policyholders. The stockholders did not protest this decision because 
the initial profit derived from the participating policies was small. However, 
when the company’s officers began to emphasize the participating portion of 
the business, there arose a conflict of views between the company’s owners and 
management. The management persisted in returning the profits of the par-
ticipating contracts to the policyholders. The owners, on the other hand, de-
manded that they be paid all of the profits not legally required to be paid to 
the participating policyholders. The officers of the company were able to en-
force their view since they controlled a majority of the stock. Hence, the div-
idends paid to the stockholders never included any of the earnings from the 
participating branch of the company … (eventually) Mutualization was pro-
posed in order to remove the conflict of interests between management and 
stockholders.”
As the fraction of participating business grew, stockholders were unwilling to 
bear the downside risk associated with these policies without also being able to 
participate in the potential profits. There existed a fundamental conflict between 
stockholders and policyholders related to the presence of participating policies, 
and the only way to resolve this conflict was to remove it, via mutualization.
 
Alternative Specification for Participating Insurance
An alternative specification for participating insurance is found in Garven and 
Pottier (1995). Our model of participating insurance differs from theirs in several 
ways. First, we consider a fixed expected loss, which forces the premium to vary 
with the participation rate. That is, for a fixed expected loss, a higher participation 
rate results in a higher premium. In contrast, Garven and Pottier (1995) impose 
a financing constraint whereby the premium is constant for all levels of partici-
pation. This produces a trade-off between expected losses and the participation 
rate. For a fixed premium, higher participation results in less insurance coverage. 
This difference between the models is somewhat superficial, as it simply amounts 
to two views of the same problem. Our formulation is probably more applicable 
to property-liability lines, where a fixed loss must be insured, while the Garven 
and Pottier (1995) perspective more closely mirrors a permanent life insurance 
contract, where the policyholder may have a fixed amount she can spend, and 
chooses a level of insurance coverage consistent with that amount.
To highlight the similarities between the models, Table 3 imposes a financing 
constraint as in Garven and Pottier (1995). We use the same parameter values from 
Tables 1 and 2, with the exception that the fixed premium is set at $1,000. For var-
ious levels of participation, γ, we calculate the expected loss such that the value 
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of the stockholders’ claim, Ve, equals the stockholders’ paid-in equity, S0. Parame-
ter values used in the calculation are listed in panel (a). Panel (b) contains the ex-
pected losses associated with various participation levels. In addition, panel (b) 
reports the market values of the stockholders’ claim Ve, the policyholder’s claim 
H0, and the government’s claim T0.
A $1,000 premium will buy a nonparticipating insurance contract covering ex-
pected claims equal to $991.47. As in Garven and Pottier (1995), an inverse re-
lationship exists between the fixed insurance component and the equity-based 
participation component. For reference, the last line of panel (b) contains the 
Table 3. Trade-off Between Expected Losses and Level of Participation 
Panel (a)
  PP *0 = 1000    βi = 0.50  
 σL = 400     E(ri) = 8.5%  
  rf = 5%    σi = 10.0%  
  E(rm) = 12%    τ = 35%  
 σm = 20.0%   S0 = 500
Panel (b)
                                                                                             Market                  Market                 Market 
                                  Stock                                                Value of                Value of               Value of
Participation        Company              Expected          Stockholders’      Policyholder’s    Government’s 
Level (γ)              Premium  PP
*
0             Loss                 Claim (Ve)            Claim (H0)            Claim (T0)
 0.00 1,000.00 991.47 500.00 928.18 71.81
 0.10 1,000.00 970.70 500.00 924.12 75.87
 0.20 1,000.00 947.36 500.00 919.40 80.60
 0.30 1,000.00 920.74 500.00 913.82 86.18
 0.40 1,000.00 889.75 500.00 907.06 92.94
 0.50 1,000.00 852.68 500.00 898.61 101.38
 0.60 1,000.00 806.58 500.00 887.59 112.41
 0.70 1,000.00 745.55 500.00 872.18 127.82
 0.80 1,000.00 655.03 500.00 847.76 152.24
 0.90 1,000.00 476.30 500.00 795.23 204.77
 0.925 1,000.00 383.61 500.00 766.37 233.63
 0.95 1,000.00 208.29 500.00 709.98 290.02
 0.975 1,000.00 0.00 492.07 649.32 358.60
 0.99 1,000.00 0.00 482.09 659.31 358.60
 1.00 1,000.00 0.00 475.43 665.97 358.60
 1.00 1,500.00 991.47 0.00 1428.18 71.81
Table reports the expected loss stockholders are willing to insure, given a fixed premium of $1,000 
combined with various levels of policyholder participation (γ). For each level of γ, the expected loss 
is calculated such that the value of the stockholders’ claim, Ve, equals the stockholders’ paid-in equity, 
S0. Parameter values are listed in Panel (a). Panel (b) contains the expected losses associated with var-
ious participation levels. In addition, panel (b) reports the market value of the stockholders’ claim Ve, 
the policyholder’s claim H0, and the government’s claim T0. For reference, the last line of panel (b) con-
tains the fully participating premium associated with an expected loss of $991.47 insured through a 
mutual company
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fully participating premium associated with an expected loss of $991.47, insured 
through a mutual company.18 Table 3 illustrates the tradeoff between losses and 
participation that results when we impose a financing constraint. Figure 5 plots 
the values from Table 3.
However, there are two more fundamental differences between the Garven 
and Pottier (1995) model and ours, and these differences are revealed in Table 
3 and Figure 5. First, in addition to the policyholder and stockholders, we in-
clude the government’s claim on taxable income. The government contributes 
no capital, yet has a valuable claim on residual income. This means that, unlike 
Garven and Pottier (1995), it is not possible for both the policyholder and stock-
holder to obtain claims with market values equal to each party’s paid-in capital. 
We maintain the assumption that stockholders will issue insurance only when 
the value of their claim equals the stockholders’ paid-in equity, which implies 
18 This premium is equal to the $1000 nonparticipating premium, plus the $500 initial stock-
holder equity. As in the earlier numerical example, it is assumed that policyholders can “mu-
tualize” by purchasing the stockholders’ claim for its fair market value of $500.
Figure 5. Trade-off Between Expected Losses and Level of Participation. Figure plots the 
expected loss stockholders are willing to insure, given a fixed premium of $1,000 combined 
with various levels of policyholder participation (γ). For each level of γ, the expected loss is 
calculated such that the value of the stockholders’ claim, Ve, equals the stockholders’ paid-
in equity, S0. In addition, figure plots the market value of the stockholders’ claim Ve, the 
policyholder’s claim H0, and the government’s claim T0.
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that the market value of the policyholder’s claim will be strictly less than the 
premium.19
A second difference between the models relates to the types of assets the insur-
ance company can invest in. In Garven and Pottier (1995), the insurance company 
invests premiums in a positive-NPV investment with a market value in excess of 
the purchase price. In contrast, we assume that the insurance company must pay 
the market price for all investments, and thus there exists no additional surplus 
to be captured by policyholders or stockholders.20 Along with the presence of the 
government’s tax claim, this second feature reinforces the result that it is not pos-
sible for both the policyholder and stockholders to obtain claims with market val-
ues equal to each party’s paid-in capital.
The effect of these assumptions is readily apparent in Table 3. First, there is a 
direct trade-off between the value of the policyholder and government claims. For 
a fixed premium, a smaller fixed (insurance) component leads to a larger equity 
(participation) component, which increases the potential taxable income. Second, 
stockholders cannot profitably offer participating insurance at levels of partici-
pation above 95 percent, since the value of their equity claim is less than paid-in 
stockholder equity.21
One might ask whether a policyholder would ever choose to purchase partici-
pating insurance contracts such as those in Table 3, since the policyholder’s mar-
ket value for nonparticipating insurance is always greater than the market value of 
participating insurance. The answer depends on the nature of the policyholder’s 
loss exposure. If the policyholders face a fixed loss, then choosing a lower level 
of insurance coverage and a higher level of participation doesn’t alter the fixed 
loss facing the insured; it simply means that a larger fraction of the loss is self-in-
sured. We conduct a second simulation of policyholder expected utilities, assum-
ing a fixed loss exposure with expected losses equal to $1,000.22 The results are 
qualitatively similar to the results of the first simulation: The least risk-averse pol-
icyholders prefer fully participating insurance, issued by a mutual company; pol-
19 An alternative would be to set the premium so that the market value of the policyholder’s 
claim equals the initial premium, in which case the stockholders’ claim would be worth less 
than initial stockholder equity. We do not choose this approach for several reasons. First, if the 
stockholders’ objective is to maximize the value of the insurance enterprise, they would opti-
mally forego issuing policies that reduce firm value. Second, policyholders have incentive to 
purchase insurance beyond a profit motive (i.e., the incentive to remove a risk exposure), and 
will partially insure even at actuarially unfair prices (Arrow (1974)).
20 This is not the same as assuming that stockholders’ cannot make money by investing in a 
stock insurance company. Indeed, in our model stockholders charge a premium that produces 
a positive expected return consistent with the underlying investment and underwriting risk 
exposures. However, the investments themselves must be purchased at their fair market price. 
Thus, the initial value of the insurance enterprise is equal to the total paid-in capital, and value 
is not created by combining the premium and stockholder equity. Any excess profit accruing 
to stockholders comes at the expense of policyholders, and vice versa.
21 These results are sensitive to including the government’s claim on taxable income in our 
model. In a frictionless, complete market model without taxes, stockholders would be able 
to profitably offer participating contracts at all levels of participation, and there would exist a 
continuum of policyholders who would optimally purchase these policies, with an inverse re-
lation between risk aversion and participation.
22 These simulation results are omitted for brevity, but are available upon request.
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icyholders with intermediate levels of risk aversion optimally purchase partially 
participating contracts with low levels of participation; and the most risk-averse 
policyholders prefer nonparticipating insurance, issued by a stock company.
 
Conclusion 
We study an equilibrium in which both stock and mutual companies are al-
lowed to issue participating business. We assume that the mutual insurer issues 
only fully participating insurance, while the stock company can issue both non-
participating and participating policies. The stock company sets premiums on 
both participating and nonparticipating policies to provide a fair expected return, 
and policyholders choose the contract that maximizes expected utility. A novel 
feature of our model is that we simultaneously analyze both the policyholder 
choice and shareholder fair-return problems.
We demonstrate that when stockholders set premiums to provide a fair ex-
pected return on their investment, stockholders will never find it optimal to of-
fer fully participating insurance. The reason is that fully participating contracts 
require the stockholders to bear a certain amount of downside risk, yet exclude 
the stockholders from potential profits. Stockholders can profitably offer partially 
participating insurance. When the policyholder participation fraction is high, the 
stockholders’ fair-return premium is so large that the utility-maximizing policy-
holder always prefers fully participating insurance from the mutual company. 
Policies with lower levels of policyholder participation are optimal for policy-
holders with relatively high risk aversion, and policyholders with the highest lev-
els of risk aversion prefer nonparticipating insurance, issued by a stock company.
Our results help explain why stock insurers so rarely issue participating con-
tracts despite their tangible benefit of reducing agency costs. We suggest that 
such benefits are both important and real, but that profitability or regulatory con-
straints may prevent stock insurers from exercising those benefits in equilibrium. 
Thus, our study provides one way of reconciling the empirical facts with the the-
oretical models and insights of Garven and Pottier (1995) and Krishnaswami and 
Pottier (2001). Lastly, we demonstrate that the desire to purchase participating in-
surance is decreasing in risk aversion.
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